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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent
 e 
v. 
STEVEN TROY SPAN, Case No. 890152 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(i) (Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
first degree felony convictions). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court violate Appellant's 
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and an 
impartial jury and his statutory right to a jury selection free 
of racial discrimination by allowing the prosecutor's racially 
motivated exercise of a peremptory challenge? 
2. Should this Court allow prosecutors to disobey trial 
court orders as long as there is sufficient evidence to translate 
the misconduct into harmless error? 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's 
conviction? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions are 
set forth in the addendum to this brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 16, 1989, a jury convicted Appellant of 
aggravated arson, a first degree felony violation of Utah Code 
Ann* section 76-6-103 (R. 55). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. THE FIRE STARTED WHILE APPELLANT WAS AT HOME WITH HIS FATHER. 
On November 16, 1988, between 3:12 and 3:20 a.m.. Brent 
Van Os and Curt Taylor drove past the 2800 South Adams apartment 
complex and noticed a fire in a second story apartment (T. 136-
137, 150). The fire department received a call about the fire at 
3:32 a.m. (T. 89). One of the firemen estimated that it took the 
team approximately five minutes to arrive at the scene of the 
fire (T. 90, 95). Fire investigator David Meldrum concluded that 
the fire had burned for a total of fifteen or twenty minutes 
before the fire department arrived (T. 272). 
Appellant's father, Alvin Span, testified that on 
November 16, 1988, he was at home with his son from 1:00 a.m. 
until 3:15 a.m., when Appellant left in his car to move to Nevada 
(To 442-447). Mr. Span saw no fire accelerants in Appellant's 
possession that night (T. 447). 
B. THE CONDITION OF THE APARTMENT INDICATED SEVERAL POSSIBLE 
SOURCES OF THE FIRE, AND NONE OF THE EVIDENCE POINTED 
CONCLUSIVELY TO ARSON. 
As is discussed in detail in Point III of this brief, 
the fire investigation in this case was incomplete and 
inconclusive. There were no accelerant containers or other arson 
tools found at the scene of the fire (T. 198). There was 
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conflicting testimony about whether there were pour patterns, and 
no testimony that any patterns in the apartment indicated 
intentional burning (T. 201-202, 283, 285)* There were numerous 
possible natural sources of the fire, and many of these were not 
investigated (T. 111-114, 117, 120-122, 171-172, 192-193, 196, 
198-200, 292, 366). There were no signs of forced entry into the 
burned apartment to which Appellant had no access (T. 100, 239, 
204)• A man and woman were seen near the fire (T. 218). 
C. THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN APPELLANT AND THE ARSON VICTIM DO NOT 
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT STARTED THE FIRE. 
The second story apartment that burned was rented to 
Barbara Lee, the mother of Appellant's child, Falcon (T. 308-
310). At the time of the fire, Ms. Lee worked as a cocktail 
waitress in a topless bar, the Barbed Wire, located at 348 West 
500 South in Salt Lake City (T. 311). She worked every night 
from 6:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m., while Appellant watched Falcon (T. 
311, 368). Ms. Lee frequently had problems with male patrons at 
work (T. 371 J.1 
Ms. Lee rented the new apartment after she and 
Appellant broke up around November 7, 1988 (T. 309-310). Their 
decision to break up their four year relationship was mutual, and 
they went shopping for new apartments together (T. 461). During 
1 Ms. Lee seemed to be having difficulties with other 
people during this time. In September of 1988, Ms. Lee's next 
door neighbor, Ronda, punched Ms. Lee in the eye because Ronda 
thought Ms. Lee had reported Ronda's welfare fraud (T. 369-370). 
Ronda also followed Ms. Lee around when they were in their cars 
(T. 373). Ms. Lee claimed that Ronda moved to Idaho prior to 
the fire (T. 373). 
3 
the course of their breakup, Appellant damaged Ms. Lee's car 
windshield twice, once because she threatened to stop him from 
seeing his daughter and once because she left before Appellant 
was finished speaking with her (T. 336-337, 344-346)• 
On November 16, Ms. Lee spent the day with Appellant, 
their daughter, Falcon, and Appellant's father (T. 312-313). 
Appellant and his father were smoking cigarettes in Ms. Lee's 
apartment on November 16, 1988 (T. 366). 
That night, after Ms. Lee went to work, Appellant came 
into the Wire (the bar in the basement of the Elarbed Wire) 
between 7s30 and 8s00 (T. 318). He asked Ms. Lee if she had any 
money and asked her to buy him a drink (T. 319). She gave him 
five dollars and bought him a drink (T. 319). He sat and watched 
Ms. Lee for about an hour and then left (T. 320). 
Randy Brown, a steady customer at the Wire, who had 
helped Ms. Lee move her belongings into her new apartment, was 
also at the Wire that night (T. 318). When Mr. Brown left the 
Wire to go to his truck, Ms. Lee accompanied him outside, and 
they discovered that his truck had been vandalized (T. 321). Mr. 
Brown did not look to see if other cars in the Barbed Wire 
parking lot had been vandalized (T. 380). 
Twenty minutes after he left the Wire, Appellant called 
Ms. Lee (T. 320). Ms. Lee accused Appellant of vandalizing Mr. 
Brown's car, which accusation he denied (T. 323)* About fifteen 
minutes later, Appellant returned to the Wire (T. 323). When he 
arrived, he sat next to Mr. Brown and spoke with him for about 
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fifteen minutes (T. 326)* Mr. Brown testified that Appellant 
asked him if he was Ms. Lee's new boyfriend, and they discussed 
whether or not Appellant had vandalized Mr. Brown's truck (T. 
382). At about 11:00, Appellant went to the parking lot, where 
he apparently remained until closing at 1:00, at which time he 
came into the Wire again, but was told the bar was closing (T. 
327). The Wire staff left together and went to Denny's, and Mr. 
Brown went there with Ms. Lee in her car (T. 328). Ms. Lee 
stayed with Mr. Brown that night, and found out by calling her 
father the next morning that her apartment had burned (T. 331-
333). 
After leaving the Wire, Appellant went home to talk 
with his father, and decided to move to Nevada (T. 442-447). 
They were together until about 3:15 a.m., at which time the elder 
Mr. Span left on a truck driving job and Appellant drove off with 
his car packed to go to Nevada (T. 442-447). 
Appellant testified that after leaving his father, he 
stopped at a gas station and then drove to Ms. Lee's apartment to 
tell her that in moving back to Las Vegas, he didn't intend to 
abandon his rights as a father to Falcon, but when he saw the 
fire, he drove away in a panic (T. 472). He drove to Karen 
Bateman's apartment (Ms. Bateman was, both before and after the 
fire, a friend of both Ms. Lee and Appellant) to tell her about 
how he felt about Ms. Lee's conduct, and that he was moving to 
Las Vegas (T. 393-395). At trial, Ms. Bateman testified that 
Appellant told her that Ms. Lee's apartment was in flames (T. 
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395-399). 
While Appellant was in Nevada, Ms. Lee continued to 
interact with him, and he gave her furniture and other items 
during that time period (T. 408). 
Appellant testified at trial that he did not set Ms. 
Lee's apartment on fire (T. 477). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Before the jurors were sworn, Appellant moved to quash 
the jury, alleging that the prosecutor had used a peremptory 
challenge to remove the only racial minority panel member (T. 
62). The court denied this motion, concluding that Appellant was 
not timely in raising it, and concluding that Appellant had not 
proven himself a member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65, 
69). 
Because Appellant raised his objection to the 
peremptory challenge at the first opportunity outside the 
presence of the jury and before the jurors were sworn, it was 
timely under Utah law. Under state and federal constitutional 
provisions relating to equal protection of the laws, due process 
2 The morning after Ms. Bateman's conversation with 
Appellant, she was interviewed by fire investigator Brown, who 
indicated that Ms. Bateman had recited Appellant's previous 
threats to blow up Ms. Lee's car and burn up her apartment and 
her father's house, and Ms. Bateman quoted Appellant as having 
said "I flamed Barbara's apartment." (T. 426). 
Ms. Bateman explained at trial that she was unsure of 
what Appellant had said on the night of the fire because she was 
drunk that night, adding that regardless of what Appellant said, 
Ms. Bateman did not think Appellant was responsible for the fire 
(T. 395, 399). During the interview between Mr. Brown and Ms. 
Bateman, Ms. Lee was present and repeatedly interrupted and 
interjected comments (T. 427-428). 
6 
of law, and fair trial, and under state and federal jury 
selection laws, Appellant's race does not preclude him from 
objecting to the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge 
on the basis of race. 
During the State's case-in-chief, Appellant moved to 
prohibit the prosecution from eliciting evidence concerning arson 
suspects other than Appellant (T. 414-415). Immediately after 
this motion was granted, the prosecutor elicited the forbidden 
evidence from the State's witness (T. 414). Appellant moved for 
a mistrial, which the court denied (T. 415-417). 
While the prosecutor's disobedience of the trial 
court's order constitutes reversible error under conventional 
prosecutorial misconduct cases, Appellant asks this Court to 
adopt a standard of automatic reversal in cases such as the 
instant one involving blatant disobedience of the trial court by 
the prosecutor. 
The evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the 
fire in Ms. Lee's apartment was caused by arson or by Appellant. 
Because the State failed to sustain its burden of proving 
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should 
reverse Appellant's conviction and declare him innocent as a 
matter of law. 
I. 
THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL 
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND 
A FAIR TRIAL, AND STATE AND FEDERAL 
JURY SELECTION LAWS BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR'S 
RACIALLY MOTIVATED EXERCISE OF 
A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
7 
A. THE PROSECUTOR, USING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE, REMOVED THE ONLY 
NON-CAUCASIAN FROM THE JURY, 
Before Appellant's jury was sworn, Appellant moved to 
quash the jury, alleging that the prosecutor had used his last 
peremptory challenge to remove the only racial minority member 
(T. 62). The court denied this motion without evaluating the 
merits of the claim, concluding that Appellant was not timely in 
raising it, and concluding that Appellant had not proven himself 
a member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65, 69). The 
transcript pages covering this issue are included in Appendix 1. 
B. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY WAS TIMELY. 
After the court's initial indication that Appellant's 
motion to quash the jury came too late, defense counsel 
explained that her objection followed the removal of Mr. Phung by 
minutes, that the challenge removing Mr. Phung was the 
prosecution's last, and that defense counsel had objected to that 
challenge at the first opportunity outside the presence of the 
jury, before they had been sworn (T. 67). 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which governs 
challenges to jury selection, provides the following time limits 
for such challenges: 
(1) Within seven days after the moving 
party discovered, or by the exercise of 
diligence could have discovered the grounds 
therefore, and in any event before the trial 
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may 
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an 
indictment, or for other appropriate relief, 
on the ground of substantial failure to 
comply with this act in selecting a grand or 
8 
trial jury.^ 
• o • • 
This rule is also applied to evaluate the timeliness of 
constitutional jury selection challenges.^ Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 18(c)(ii) also provides that challenges to 
panels are timely if raised prior to the swearing in of the 
jurors. 
Because Appellant objected to the jury selection 
process within minutes of the prosecutor8s peremptory challenge 
of Mr. Phung, and before the jury was sworn (T. 69), the 
objection was timely under Utah law. 
C. APPELLANT'S RACE DOES NOT PROTECT THE PROSECUTOR'S ABUSE OF 
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE FROM SCRUTINY. 
The trial court refused to consider Appellant's 
3 The Utah Jury Selection Act contains two provisions 
concerning Appellant's racial discrimination objection. Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-46-3 provides: 
A citizen shall not be excluded or 
exempt from jury service on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or 
economic status. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2 provides: 
It is the policy of this state that 
persons selected for jury service be selected 
at random from a fair cross section of the 
population of the area served by the court, 
and that all qualified citizens have the 
opportunity in accordance with this act to be 
considered for jury service and have the 
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned 
for that purpose. 
4 See State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 
1986)(defendant*s challenge to the constitutionality of the jury 
selection in her case was waived because it was not raised in the 
trial court before the jury was sworn, as required by section 76-
46-16(1)). 
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allegation that the prosecutor removed Mr. Phung for racial 
purposes because Appellant, as a Caucasian (T. 68), was not a 
member of a "cognizable racial group" (T. 65)» It is true that 
the cases named specifically during the motion to quash the jury 
pose as an element of a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination a showing that the appellant and the jurors 
stricken by the peremptory challenges share membership in a 
cognizable racial group.^ 
However, defense counsel argued that the showing of 
racial identity between a criminal defendant and a juror removed 
by peremptory challenge is not a mandatory showing, and argued 
that other cases recognize that an appellant may object to the 
improper exercise of peremptory challenge by the prosecutor, 
regardless of the race of the appellant (T. 67). 
As is discussed infra, Appellant's rights to equal 
protection, due process, and to a fair trial under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions, and his rights under the Utah and 
United States jury selection laws are not contingent on his race. 
1. EQUAL PROTECTION 
a. Federal Equal Protection 
In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988), this Court 
explained the prima facie showing a defendant must make in order 
to raise a challenge under Batson v* Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986): 
To attack a peremptory challenge under 
5 Cantu, 750 P.2d at 595; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
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Batson, the defendant must establish a prima 
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the 
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges 
to remove from the panel members of the 
defendant's race, and (3) that all the 
relevant facts and circumstances raise an 
inference that the prosecution used its 
peremptory challenges to exclude the 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of 
their race. 
Id, at 595. 
Inasmuch as the defendant in Cantu was apparently of 
6 
the same racial origin as the juror stricken, this Court was not 
in a position in that case to evaluate whether or not the racial 
identity factor set forth in Batson is a prerequisite to raising 
the claim, or merely one mode of proof of racial discrimination. 
Appellant urges this Court to examine the analysis 
provided by State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 753 P.2d 
6 The defendant in Cantu was able to meet the first two 
prongs of the Batson test because he was hispanic and the juror 
stricken was 
one of two people with Hispanic surnames 
picked to supplement the jury venire. 
Although the challenged panel member, Mr. 
Lopez, was a native-born American and did not 
respond when the panel was asked if any of 
them considered themselves a member of a 
minority group, he did concede that he was of 
Hispanic ancestry. 
.... 
When asked if he considered himself a member 
of a minority group, Lopez, a native born 
American, indicated that he did not. Only 
when pressed on the point did he concede that 
his ancestry was Hispanic. There is no 
indication on the record that Lopez appeared 
Hispanic or spoke with an accent. 
Id. at 596, 597. 
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1168 (Ariz.App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.), U»S. appeal 
pending, and to recognize that the racial identity factor is not 
a prerequisite to raising a claim of racial discrimination under 
Batson. 
In State v. Superior Court (Maricopa County), 753 P.2d 
1168 (Ariz. App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.)# U.S. appeal 
pending, the court explored a white defendant's Batson challenge 
to peremptory challenge removal of two black veniremen. Id^ at 
1169. Upon the defendant's objection during jiary selection, the 
trial court requested the prosecution to explain the exercise of 
peremptory challenges removing the two black jurors* _Id. The 
State refused to comply with the trial court's request, and 
sought special relief from the appellate court, arguing that 
because the defendant was white and the challenged jurors were 
black, the defendant had no standing and could not make a prima 
facie showing under Batson. Id. at 1169-1170. 
The appellate court rejected the State's reasoning, 
explaining that 
[w]hatever his race, a criminal defendant has 
standing to challenge the system used to 
select his grand or petit jury, on the ground 
that it arbitrarily excludes from service the 
members of any race, and thereby denies him 
due process of law. 
Id. at 1170-1171, quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, at 504 
(1972). The Court explained federal caselaw showing that the 
racial identity requirement in Batson is neither a standing 
7 Peters v. Kiff is discussed in detail in subsection 2 
of subsection B of this point. 
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requirement, nor an essential element to every prima facie case, 
but is merely one factor among many that might be used to raise 
an inference of racial discrimination. See .id. at 1170-1172. 
The court concluded that the trial court was acting within its 
discretion in ordering the State to explain the peremptory 
challenges of the two black jurors, E^d. at 1172. 
b. State Uniform Operation of Laws 
Regardless of this Court's acceptance of the 
interpretation of federal standards espoused by the Arizona 
appellate court in the Maricopa County case, Appellant notes that 
this Court has yet to define how the Utah State Constitution 
uniform operation of laws provision applies to claims of racial 
discrimination in jury selection. 
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this Court 
explained that while federal precedents interpreting the federal 
equal protection clause may be persuasive in the interpretation 
of the state constitutional uniform operation of laws provision, 
they are not binding - this Court is free to adopt 
interpretations of the Utah uniform operations of laws provision 
that provide greater protection than that provided by federal 
interpretations of the federal equal protection clause. ^M. at 
670. 
In Malan v. Lewis, this Court recognised that uniform 
operation of the laws is an essential check on the exercise of 
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government power. IcJ. at 670. Erecting a "same race" rule for 
challenges of racist exercises of peremptory challenges can 
hardly be expected to serve as a check on the exercise of 
government power. Indeed, the erection of such a rule would 
facilitate the arbitrary exercise of government power, by 
allowing even the most blatant cases of racial discrimination to 
stand unexamined, as long as those cases involve the right racial 
components (racial disparity between defendant and jurors). 
In Peters v. Kiff, in explaining why racial 
discrimination against black jurors deprives a white defendant of 
due process of law under the federal constitution, Justices 
Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart explained the harms caused by 
racial jury selection,8 
When any large and identifiable segment of 
the community is excluded from jury service, 
the effect is to remove from the jury room 
qualities of human nature and varieties of 
human experience, the range of which is 
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not 
necessary to assume that the excluded group 
will consistently vote as a class in order to 
conclude, as we do, that their exclusion 
deprives the jury of a perspective on human 
events that my have unsuspected importance in 
any case that may be presented. 
8 Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart found that due 
process forbids racist jury selection, regardless of the race of 
the criminal defendant. Peters at 494-505. Justices White, 
Brennan, and Powell concurred in the judgment expressed in the 
main opinion, noting that federal laws prohibiting racist jury 
selection reflect the central concern of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and should be read as granting standing to the 
petitioner in Peters. Id. at 505-507. Justices Burger, Blackmun 
and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that there was no proof of a 
causal connection between the denial of the petitioner's 
constitutional rights and his conviction, and noting that the 
issue was not timely raised. jEd. at 507-513. 
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Id. at 503-504. 
The main opinion noted that when racial considerations 
control jury selection, harms run to the defendant in the case 
where the discrimination takes place, to all criminal defendants 
who are deprived by corrupt jury selection systems of a fair 
cross-section of the community on their juries, and to the 
excluded jurors, who are denied their right to participate in the 
justice system and who are stigmatized as a class as being people 
of lesser quality than those who are allowed to sit on juries. 
9 
Id. at 499-500. 
Appellant urges this Court to protect him, other 
criminal defendants, and all potential jurors from racial 
discrimination in the jury selection process by interpreting 
Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution as requiring the 
state to provide a racially neutral explanation for peremptory 
challenges when the trial court finds that the facts and 
circumstances of the case raise an inference of racial 
discrimination. See State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 
753 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Ariz.App.), affirmed, 760 P.2d 541 (Ariz.), 
U.S. appeal pending, (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96-
97, "In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant 
circumstances."). 
2. DUE PROCESS 
9 See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-88 (1986) 
(discussing harms of racial discrimination in jury selection). 
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a. Federal Due Process 
Federal due process forbids racial jury selection, 
regardless of the race of the defendant on trial. As stated in 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), in the opinion of Justices 
Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart, 
The crime, and the unconstitutional state 
action, occur whether the defendant is white 
or Negro, whether he is acquitted or 
convicted. In short, when a grand or petit 
jury has been selected on an impermissible 
basis, the existence of a constitutional 
violation does not depend on the 
circumstances of the person making the claim. 
Id. at 498. 
In Peters, the petitioner, a white male who had been 
convicted of burglary in state court, argued for the first time 
in a federal habeas corpus following the affirmance of his 
conviction by the state appellate court that the juries that 
indicted and convicted him were comprised illegally, as a result 
of systematic exclusion of blacks from jury service. Ld. at 494-
495, and n. 1, 3. The state argued that because the petitioner 
was white, he had suffered no discrimination, but six members of 
the Supreme Court rejected the state's argument. 
The main opinion explains how due process governs jury 
selection and protects against racist jury selection practices: 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process."... 
[It is] well established that the Due Process 
Clause protects a defendant from jurors who 
are actually incapable of rendering an 
impartial verdict, based on the evidence and 
the law.... 
Moreover, even if there is no showing 
of actual bias in the tribunal, this Court 
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has held that due process is denied by 
circumstances that create the likelihood or 
the appearance of bias.... 
These principles compel the conclusion 
that a State cannot, consistent with due 
process, subject a defendant to indictment or 
trial by a jury that has been selected in an 
arbitrary and discriminatory manner, in 
violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. Illegal and unconstitutional 
jury selection procedures cast doubt on the 
integrity of the whole judicial process. 
They create the appearance of bias in the 
decision of individual cases, and they 
increase the risk of actual bias as well. 
Id. at 501-503 (citations omitted). 
As is discussed in subpoint D, it appears that the 
prosecutor challenged Mr. Phung because of his race. In allowing 
the prosecutor in the instant case to remove Mr. Phung from the 
jury because of his race, the trial court violated Appellant's 
federal right to due process, 
b. State Due Process 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." In interpreting this provision of 
the Utah Constitution, this Court has described as persuasive 
federal precedents interpreting the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. E.g. 
Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Industrial Commission, 649 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1982). Appellant urges this Court to adopt the 
reasoning and result of Peters v. Kiff in interpreting Article I 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
As will be shown in subsection D of this point, 
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Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury selected in an 
arbitrary and discriminatory manner. Regardless of Appellant's 
race, in allowing the prosecutor to exercise his peremptory 
challenge of Mr. Phung in a discriminatory manner, the court 
jeopardized the deliberative process of Appellant's trial, 
violated Mr. Phung's right to serve on the jury, sacrificed the 
integrity of the judicial process, and violated Appellant's right 
to due process under the Utah Constitution. See Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 498-503 (1972). 
3. TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
a. Federal Right to a Fair Trial 
A prosecutor's racist exercise of peremptory challenges 
violates an appellant's federal right to a fair trial, regardless 
of the race of the appellant. In Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987), the court 
determined that the systematic racist exclusion of jurors through 
the exercise of peremptory challenges violates the federal 
constitutional Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, 
statings 
Such an abuse distorts the jury's decision-
making, undermines the jury's integrity, and 
denies both the defendant and the public the 
impartial jury that the Constitution 
requires. 
Id. at 762. 
In Booker, two black defendants were convicted by an 
all-white jury of armed robbery. Icl. at 763-764. The jury 
selection involved multiple racially based peremptory challenges 
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Id. at 764. Both the trial court and the federal magistrate 
reviewing the voir dire in habeas corpus proceedings concluded 
that there was no precedent for prohibiting the use of peremptory 
challenges for racist purposes. Ici. at 764-765. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit provided a review of Sixth 
Amendment law pertaining to jury selection, see 775 F.2d 762, 
767-770, and concluded that the amendment prohibits the racist 
exercise of peremptory challenges: 
We conclude that a prosecutor's 
systematic use of peremptory challenges to 
excuse members of a cognizable group from a 
criminal petit jury offends the Sixth 
Amendment's protection of the defendant's 
interest in a fair trial and the public's 
interest in the integrity of judicial 
process, as well as the prosecutor's special 
duty as "the servant of the law" to see that 
"guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer." 
Id* at 772 (citations omitted). The Sixth Amendment analysis 
provided by the Sixth Circuit was in no way contingent on the 
race of the appellant. The Court recognized that racist exercise 
of peremptory challenges, by limiting the representation on the 
jury of a fair cross section of the community, impairs the 
process of deliberation and destroys public confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial process. _Id. at 770-771. 
As will be demonstrated in subsection D of this point, 
the record in this case raises the inference that was not 
rebutted that the prosecutor removed Mr. Phung with a peremptory 
challenge for racist purposes. In allowing the prosecutor's 
peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung to stand, the trial court 
violated Appellant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
b. State Right to an Impartial Jury. 
Article I section 12 provides, in part, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed." 
Aside from following federal interpretations of the 
federal guarantee of an impartial jury, this Court should decide 
as a matter of state constitutional law that Article I section 12 
of the Utah Constitution prohibits arbitrary and discriminatory 
jury selection such as that occurring in this case. 
Appellant refers this Court to state court decisions 
interpreting state constitutional provisions designed to insure 
impartial juries through representation of fair cross sections of 
the community on juries, which decisions have concluded that the 
racist use of peremptory challenges is impermissible under state 
constitutional provisions, regardless of the race of the 
appellant. ^  This Court has already relied on some of these 
cases in evaluating racial discrimination in the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge. Appellant requests that this Court adopt 
a specific interpretation of the Utah Constitution impartial jury 
10 See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); State 
v. Neil, 487 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Com, v. Spares, 387 N.E.2d 
499 (Mass.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 
612 P.2d 716 (N.M. 1980). 
11 See State v. Cantu, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1989), which cites and discusses State v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 
(Cal. 1978); State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Tla.)# cert, 
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2873 (1988). 
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provision, which prohibits racial exercises of peremptory 
challenges. 
4. UTAH AND UNITED STATES JURY SELECTION LAWS 
a* Federal Jury Selection Law 
Appellant is entitled under federal law to challenge 
racial discrimination in the selection of his jury, regardless 
of his race. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), Justices 
Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart concluded that standing of the 
petitioner to object to the racist jury selection involved in 
that case was assured by 18 U.S.C. section 243, which provides: 
No citizen possessing all other 
qualifications which are or may be prescribed 
by law shall be disqualified for service as 
grand or petit juror in any court of the 
United States, or of any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude... 
Id. at 504-505. This statute was also mentioned as a basis for 
the petitioner's standing by concurring justices White, Brennan, 
and Powell. Id. at 505-507. 
b. State Jury Selection Laws 
The policy governing jury selection in Utah is 
expressed in Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2: 
It is the policy of this state that 
persons selected for jury service be selected 
at random from a fair cross section of the 
population of the area served by the court, 
and that all qualified citizens have the 
opportunity in accordance with this act to be 
considered for jury service and have the 
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned 
for that purpose. 
More specifically, Utah Code Ann. section 76-46-3 prohibits 
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racial discrimination in jury selection in all cases, regardless 
of the race of the litigants: 
A citizen shall not be excluded or 
exempt from jury service on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or 
economic status• 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16, which governs claims 
under the Utah Jury Selection Act, poses as a prerequisite to 
correction of violations under the act a finding of actual 
prejudice. As explained in the main opinion in Peters v. Kiff, 
the dangers posed by racist jury selection, while difficult to 
prove, are of such gravity that prejudice is effectively presumed 
in these cases. See id. at 504. 
In denying Appellant the benefits due him under state 
and federal jury selection laws because of Appellant's race, the 
trial court violated the state and federal jury selection laws, 
and this error should be presumed prejudicial. 
D. THE RECORD OF THE VOIR DIRE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROSECUTOR 
EXERCISED HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF MR. PHUNG IN A RACIALLY 
DISCRIMINATORY MANNER. 
In State v. Cantu, 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1989), 
this Court vacated the appellant's conviction cifter finding that 
the prosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge was indirec-
tly motivated by race. Id^ . at 4. While the claim of improper 
exercise of peremptory challenge was originally raised under 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) as a federal equal 
protection case, after remand, this Court referred to State v. 
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978), a case decided under a state 
constitutional fair trial provision, for the elements of a prima 
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facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges s 
California courts, for example, require 
that the issue of group-biased peremptory 
challenges be raised in a timely manner and 
that the complaining party make a prima facie 
case of bias. The elements necessary to 
such a prima facie case include (1) as 
complete a record as possible, (2) a showing 
that persons excluded belong to a cognizable 
group under the representative cross-section 
rule, and (3) a showing that there exists "a 
strong likelihood that such persons are being 
challenged because of their group association 
rather than because of any specific bias." 
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 280, 281, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748, 764 
(1978). 
Cantu at 4. 
This court quoted a case from Florida, another 
jurisdiction which decides cases of racially motivated peremptory 
challenges under the state constitution fair trial provision, 12 
in explaining the factors to be considered in evaluating the 
state's racially neutral explanation for the peremptory chal-
lenges 
"We agree that the presence of one or 
more of these factors will tend to show that 
the state's reasons are not actually 
supported by the record or are an 
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias 
not shown to be shared by the juror in 
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or 
perfunctory examination, assuming neither the 
trial court nor opposing counsel had 
12 See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984)(the 
controlling opinion cited in Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350 
(Fla.App.3 Dist. 1987); and State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla. 
1988); which opinion provides that racist peremptory challenges 
violate the state constitutional provision concerning impartial 
jurors). 
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questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror 
out for special questioning designed to evoke 
a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's 
reason is unrelated to the facts of the case, 
and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally 
applicable to juror [sic] not challenged." 
State v, Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 
1988)[cert, denied, cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 
2873 (1988)]..• 
Id. 
In Cantu, this Court did not apply these tests element 
by element, but apparently surveyed all the relevant facts and 
concluded that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of 
discriminatory peremptory challenge, which the prosecution failed 
to rebuts 
In the transcript of the proceedings 
below, the prosecutor asked no questions 
during the initial voir dire examination, and 
when the supplemental jurors were introduced, 
the prosecutor asked only one question before 
exercising his first and only peremptory 
challenge of the entire voir dire process. 
The question was both desultory and insuffi-
cient to establish any specific bias on the 
part of the jurors. "I don't know if you 
asked this, Judge. I would ask you to 
inquire of either of these two folks whether 
or not any of their friends or families have 
been similarly charged. I don't know if you 
did." 
The facts and circumstances of the instant case both 
raise the inference that the prosecutor challenged Mr. Phung 
because of Mr. Phung's race, and indicate that the prosecutor's 
explanation of the challenge fails to rebut the inference.^3 
13 See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1988)("In 
applying Batson, we will examine the record to determine if all 
the 'facts and circumstances' raise the inference that the 
prosecution used its peremptory challenges in a racially 
discriminatory manner. While we recognize that the trial court 
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follows 
The entire examination of Mr. Phung proceeded as 
My name is Viet Phung. My wife's name is 
Tontee Wen (phonetic). We living at 2332 
West between 3332 West and Hope Lane. And I 
work for a supermarket, Dan's. My wife work 
for American Express Corporation. I'm been 
in the — the first time I've been in court. 
I have a three children: 18, 15, and 9. And 
I graduate from high school in Viet Nam. 
THE COURT: How long have you been a 
citizen? 
MR. PHUNG: I've been a citizen for 
about, let's see, nine years. 
THE COURT: This is your first experience 
in court? 
MR. PHUNG: Yes. 
(T. 19). 
The examination revealed no inability of Mr. Phung to 
serve as an unbiased juror, and the prosecutor made no effort to 
delve further into Mr. Phung*s background or perspective. The 
prosecutor's only contribution to the voir dire was asking the 
court to ask all of the jurors about their ability to evaluate 
testimony from police officers and their ability to evaluate 
circumstantial evidence (T. 35-36), and asking juror Damewood 
about how his employment by the sheriff's office would influence 
his performance as a juror (T. 44-45). 
Most of the characteristics revealed about Mr. Phung 
were shared by most of the jurors, and the characteristics of the 
other jurors stricken by the prosecutor do not reflect a 
may be in a better position to make that determination initially, 
an evidentiary hearing held after remand could not recreate all 
the 'facts and circumstances' as they existed at the time the 
challenge was made.") 
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correlation between Mr. Phung's characteristics (unrelated to his 
race) and the prosecutor's exercise of the other three peremptory 
challenges. 
14 The state's other peremptory challenges struck Ivan 
Wright, Carleen Hatch and Robin Oliver (R. 56-57). 
Nineteen of the twenty other jurors had been married, 
and one of the jurors stricken by the state was not married* 
Married jurors: Collette Stone (T. 13); Cheryl Andrews (T. 14); 
Joyce Bishop (T. 15); Linda Miller (T. 17); Robin Oliver (T. 18); 
Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); James Allfrey (T. 
23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne Parkin (T. 24); Idonna 
Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 25); Marion Pettey (T. 26); 
Robert Curtis (T. 27); Robert Damewood (T. 28); Joyce Kirkham (T. 
29); Thomas Cain (T. 30); Janet Fristrup (T. 31); George Young 
(T. 31). 
At least seventeen of the twenty other jurors had 
children, and one of the jurors stricken by the state had no 
children. Parent jurors: Collette Stone (T. 13); Cheryl Andrews 
(T. 15); Joyce Bishop (T. 16); Linda Miller (T. 17); Robin Oliver 
(T. 18); Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); James 
Allfrey (T. 23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne Parkin (T. 24); 
Idonna Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T. 
27); Robert Curtis (T. 27); Robert Damewood (T. 28); Joyce 
Kirkham (T. 29); Janet Fristrup (T. 31). George Young was not 
asked if he had children (T. 31). 
Eighteen of the twenty other jurors were employed. Only 
Jennifer Stout (T. 23) and Idonna Babcock (T. 25) were not 
employed. 
Fourteen of the twenty other jurors had spouses 
employed outside the home, and two of the jurors stricken by the 
state did not have a spouse working outside the home. Jurors 
with spouses employed outside the home: Collette Stone (T. 13); 
Cheryl Andrews (T. 14); Joyce Bishop (15); Linda Miller (T. 17); 
Robin Oliver (T. 19); Michael Brown (T. 20); Keo Sorenson (T. 
22); James Allfrey (T. 23); Jennifer Stout (T. 23); Suzanne 
Parkin (T. 24); Idonna Babcock (T. 25); Thomas Cain (T. 31); 
Janet Fristrup (T. 31); George Young (T. 31). 
Thirteen of the twenty other jurors had no prior court 
experience. Inexperienced jurors: Collette Stone (T. 114); 
Cheryl Andrews (T. 15); Linda Miller (T. 18); Robin Oliver (T 
.18); Keo Sorenson (T. 22); Jennifer Stout (T. 24); Idonna 
Babcock (T. 25); Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T. 27); 
Robert Curtis (T. 27); Ivan Wright (T. 28); Thomas Cain (T. 31); 
Janet Fristrup (T. 31). 
Seven of the twenty other jurors were high school 
graduates, three of them did not complete high school, four of 
them had graduated from college, four of them had some education 
beyond high school, and two jurors' levels of education were not 
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These facts constitute a prima facie showing that the 
prosecutor's exercise of the peremptory challenge of Mr. Phung 
was racially discriminatory. 
In Cantu, this Court explained that once such a prima 
facie case is made, the prosecutor must provide a race-neutral 
reason to justify to the peremptory challenge, which relates to 
the juror or the case. Ic[. at 4. In this case, the prosecutor 
offered only a general explanation of his methods of exercising 
peremptory challenges, which neither related to Mr. Phung or to 
this case. See Appendix 1 (T. 63-65). 
Because the prosecutor's explanation for removing Mr. 
Phung with a peremptory challenge was not specific to the case or 
to Mr. Phung, it failed to rebut Appellant's prima facie showing 
that the peremptory challenge was exercised in a racially 
discriminatory manner. Appellant is entitled to a new trial. 
Cantu at 4. 
This Court may conclude that the trial court's mode of 
disposing of Appellant's objection on the grounds of waiver and 
discussed. High school graduates: Collette Stone (T. 14); Keo 
Sorenson (T. 22); Jennifer Stout (T. 24); Suzanne Parkin (T. 25); 
Idonna Babcock (T. 25); George Young (T. 31); Ivan Wright (T. 
28). Less than high school education: Robin Oliver (T. 18); 
Carleen Hatch (T. 26); Marion Pettey (T. 27). College graduates: 
Linda Miller (T. 17); Michael Brown (T. 20); Robert Curtis (T. 
27); Thomas Cain (T. 30). Some education beyond high school: 
Cheryl Andrews (T. 14); Joyce Bishop (T. 15); Robert Damewood (T. 
28); Janet Fristrup (T. 31). Education level not identified: 
James Allfrey (T. 23); Joyce Kirkham (T. 29). 
One of the other jurors, James Allfrey, worked for a 
grocery store, and he was not stricken by the prosecutor (T. 23). 
Mr. Phung was the only juror asked by the court to 
disclose how long he had been a citizen of the United States (T. 
19). 
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lack of racial qualification to object, failed to afford the 
prosecution an adequate opportunity to rebut the prima facie case 
of racial discrimination. In this event, this Court should 
remand this case instructing the trial court that Appellant has 
raised a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and ordering 
the trial court to evaluate the prosecution's efforts at 
rebutting the prima facie case.15 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DETER INTENTIONAL 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
BY REVERSING APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WITHOUT 
ENGAGING IN HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR INTRODUCED EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
During the State's case in chief, the prosecutor 
called Grant Hodson, the landlord over the apartment complex on 
Adams and 28th (T. 411-412). It was the prosecutor's intent to 
show that Mr. Hodson had no motive to burn his own property (T. 
412-413). Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning, 
the court sustained the objections, and held a bench conference 
(T. 413). After the bench conference, the prosecutor continued 
his direct examination of Mr. Hodson as follows: 
Q. Have you suffered as a result of that 
15 See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1988) 
(concurring opinion of Zimmerman, J., joined by Durham, J.)("On 
remand, I would direct the trial court to consider the defendant 
to have met his burden. Because neither Batson nor Griffith v. 
Kentucky, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), 
which made Batson retroactive, jLd. 107 S.Ct. at 710, 716, had 
been decided at the time of the trial, the prosecutor should be 
given an opportunity to rebut the inference. Once this is done, 
the trial judge can proceed to rule on the question under 
Batson."). 
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fire? 
A. Excuse me, what? 
Q. Yes or no, have you suffered as a 
result of that fire? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you start the fire? 
A. No. 
MS. WELLSs Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. It may be 
stricken. Your are to disregard it. 
(T. 414). 
Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved 
for a mistrial because the prosecutor had just violated the 
court's bench conference ruling that the State not introduce 
evidence as to whether or not Mr. Hodson started the fire (T. 
414-415). Despite the court's previous ruling prohibiting the 
introduction of this evidence (the ruling was apparently based on 
Rule of Evidence 403 (T. 417-418)), the court denied the motion 
for a mistrial, concluding that striking the testimony was an 
adequate remedy (T. 417). The transcript of this portion of the 
trial is provided in Appendix 2. 
By referring to Appendix 2, this Court can see that 
initially, the prosecutor made no claim of misunderstanding the 
court's bench ruling excluding the evidence. Rather, the 
prosecutor took issue with the ruling (T. 416-417). The court 
then indicated for the second time that the prosecutor had 
violated the court's order, and the prosecutor apologized, 
claiming for the first time that he had misunderstood the court's 
order (T. 419). 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD DETER INTENTIONAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
BY ORDERING A NEW TRIAL WITHOUT ENGAGING IN HARMLESS ERROR 
ANALYSIS. 
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In State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
reviewing similar prosecutorial disregard for trial court 
rulings, created a new standard designed to deter such conducts 
Where a prosecutor in argument interjects 
remarks deliberately intended to undermine 
the rulings of the trial court to the 
prejudice of the defendant, his conduct is so 
offensive to the sound administration of 
justice that only a new trial can effectively 
prevent such assaults on the integrity of the 
tribunal. 
Id. at 1011. 
The court explained its refusal to apply a harmless 
error analysis to the case; 
The ultimate implication of this argument is 
that a state's attorney may choose 
deliberately to ignore any trial court ruling 
just as long as the state has amassed 
overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt 
and the state's attorney's misconduct relates 
only to a portion of that evidence. We 
decline to place such a restraint on the 
ability of this court to defend the integrity 
of the judicial system. 
Id. at 1007. 
"*
l
*
ie
 Ubaldi court recognized that the United States 
Constitution does not mandate the reversal of a conviction unless 
an appellant can demonstrate that prosecutorial misconduct 
prejudiced his case, ]Ld. at 1007-1008, and proceeded to set the 
reversal standard in cases of intentional prosecutorial 
misconduct based on the court's supervisory authority over the 
administration of justice. Ic[. at 1008-1009. 
The court recognized the remedies and rationales 
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utilized in other states in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, 
and explained why the court was not satisfied with those 
remedies: 
Some tribunals have declined to use such 
supervisory power on the theory that society 
should not bear the burden of a new trial 
because of prosecutorial misconduct where a 
new trial is not constitutionally mandated^ 
According to some authorities, the evil of 
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately 
combatted through contempt sanctions, 
disciplinary boards or other means. This 
court, however, has long been of the view 
that it is ultimately responsible for the 
enforcement of court rules in prosecutorial 
misconduct cases. Upsetting a criminal 
conviction is a drastic step, but it is the 
only feasible deterrent to flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a 
trial court ruling. 
Id. at 1009. 
The court continued to explain why a meaningful 
response from the court was essential: 
We are mindful of the sage admonition that 
appellate rebuke without reversal ignores the 
reality of the adversary system of justice. 
"The deprecatory words we use in our opinions 
... are purely ceremonial.1 Government 
16 See State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1974), a case 
which did not involve intentional disobedience of a trial court 
order, but involved asking an improper question, in which the 
court stated, 
Nevertheless, the processes of justice should 
not be distorted simply for the purpose of 
censuring a mistake. [Reminiscent of Justice 
Cardozo's classic remark that: "a felon 
should not go free because a constable has 
blundered."] The critical inquiry should be 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the incident so prejudiced the jury that in 
its absence there might have been a different 
result. 
Id. at 1324 (bracketed portion footnoted in opinion). 
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counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind 
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay 
the small price of a ritualistic verbal 
spanking. The practice [of verbal criticism 
without judicial action] - recalling the 
bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the 
oysters - breeds a deplorably cynical 
attitude towards the judiciary*" Moreover, 
"[d]eliberate prosecutorial misconduct is 
presumably infrequent; to invalidate 
convictions in the few cases where this is 
proved, even on a fairly low showing of 
materiality, will have a relatively small 
impact on the desired finality of judgments 
and will deter conduct undermining the 
integrity of the judicial system." 
Id. at 1009 (citations omitted, brackets by the court). 
The court recognized that the exercise of its 
supervisory powers in erecting the new rule first required 
consideration of competing social values such as the trauma 
imposed on the victim by reprosecution, and the ability of the 
state to reprosecute. id. at 1009. The court found that the 
victim, the city of Waterbury, would not be traumatized be a new 
trial, and found that the rules of evidence would facilitate the 
State's ability to retry the case. Id. 
Appellant requests this Court to exercise its 
supervisory authority over the administration of the judicial 
system to deter intentional prosecutorial misconduct such as that 
which occurred in this case, by adopting a reversal standard like 
that adopted by the Ubaldi court. 
The victim in this case has had voluntary interactions 
with Appellant since the fire (T. 370-371, 402, 476-477), 
indicating that the potential trauma that might be imposed on her 
by a new trial is limited. Presumably, the Stcite would also be 
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able to reprosecute the case. While the costs which might be 
imposed by a retrial of this case are significant the benefits 
to be gained by this Court's enforcement of minimal standards of 
prosecutorial conduct are essential to safeguarding the dignity 
of the trial courts and the quality of criminal prosecutions. 
This Court has previously addressed the standards of 
performance which characterize prosecutors: 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charged with vigorously enforcing the 
laws "has a duty to not only secure 
appropriate convictions, but an even higher 
duty to see that justice is done." In his 
role as the State's representative in 
criminal matters# the prosecutor, therefore, 
must not only attempt to win cases, but must 
see that justice is done. Thus, while he 
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor, 
it is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
means to bring about a just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981). 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct also indicate 
that prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves in an ethical 
and decorous manner. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 provides, 
"A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and 
not simply that of an advocate." Rule of Professional Conduct 
3.4 provides in part, "A lawyer shall not ... (c) Knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an 
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists;... (e) In trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer 
does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence,...". 
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In introducing the excluded evidence in this case 
immediately after the evidence was excluded, in arguing against 
the court's ruling after introducing the evidence, and in 
claiming as a last resort that he didn't understand the bench 
ruling, the prosecutor failed to meet the basic standards of 
prosecutorial conduct. 
The application of harmless error analysis in this case 
would effectively condone this kind of conduct in all cases in 
which the prosecutor considers the evidence of guilt strong. 
Such condonation would dilute the ethical quality of the role of 
prosecutor and the power of the trial courts, and would render 
the criminal trial process into bedlam . Appellant urges that 
this Court's reversal of Appellant's conviction solely on the 
basis of the prosecutor's blatant disregard of the trial court's 
order will not only rectify the harm done to Appellant in this 
case, but will also protect the order and dignity necessary for 
the administration of justice in our jurisdiction. 
Ce UNDER TRADITIONAL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT ANALYSIS, THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
In the event that this Court declines to adopt an 
automatic reversal standard in cases involving prosecutorial 
disobedience of trial court orders, Appellant cisserts that under 
traditional analysis, the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial based on the 
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prosecutor's misconduct.17 
In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), 
apparently the only Utah case dealing with prosecutorial 
disregard and disobedience of court orders, the prosecutor 
repeatedly raised the appellant's failure to testify after the 
trial court repeatedly sustained objections to the admission of 
such evidence. I_d. at 147. After concluding that the 
prosecutor's conduct violated the appellant's right to remain 
silent, this Court found reversible error, stating: 
The references to defendant's silence 
are fundamental error, which could have 
affected the result and are therefore 
prejudicial. 
Id. at 147 (citations omitted). 
The standard for evaluating prosecutorial misconduct in 
general prosecutorial misconduct cases appears to be more 
stringent than that applied in Wiswell (a case distinguished from 
the general cases by contumacious disobedience by the 
prosecutor). The general standard is described in State v. 
Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986): 
This Court has adopted a two-part test 
for determining whether a prosecutor's remark 
warrants reversal: (1) did the remarks call 
to the attention of the jurors matters which 
they could not properly consider in 
determining their verdict, and (2) were the 
jurors under the circumstances of the 
particular case probably influenced by those 
remarks. 
17 The standard of review of this issue is the abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1974). 
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Id* at 187 (citations omitted, emphasis added)• 
Appellant urges that the less stringent Wiswell 
possible affect standard should apply in cases of intentional 
disobedience by the prosecutor.-*-° However, for purposes of 
argument, Appellant is able to show under the more stringent 
Tucker probable influence standard that reversal is appropriate 
in this case. 
1. THE PROSECUTOR CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE JURORS A MATTER 
WHICH THEY COULD NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER IN DETERMINING THEIR 
VERDICT. 
During the dispute surrounding the admission of the 
excluded evidence, the court explained that the court chose to 
exclude the evidence, apparently on the basis of Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403 (T. 417-418 (Appendix 2)).19 
The admission of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court• State v. Larson, 
109 Utah AdVe Rep* 23, 25 (Utah 1989). In choosing to elevate 
the exercise of his own discretion over that of the trial court 
by introducing the excluded evidence, the prosecutor called to 
18 See State v. Walker, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 
1981)(applying a less stringent "could have affected" threshold 
of prejudice to cases in which prosecutors knowingly use false 
testimony or foster false impressions). 
19 Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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the attention of the jurors a matter which they could not 
properly consider in determining their verdict* 
The court's decision to exclude the evidence concerning 
the elimination of other possible suspects is further supported 
by reference to State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), in 
which this Court explained the impropriety of trying to prove an 
assertion through statistical probability evidence.™ 
20 In Rammel, a witness named Dyson testified under a 
grant of immunity to his and the Appellant's involvement in a 
robbery, jtd. at 499. When initially confronted about the crime, 
Dyson denied any knowledge about or participation in the robbery, 
but later confessed. _Id. at 499. The trial court admitted the 
testimony of an Officer Welti, which indicated that most people 
who eventually confess to the commission of crimes initially lie 
to police officers about the crimes. I<3. at 500. Apparently, 
the prosecution was attempting to show with this evidence that 
Dyson's initial denial of involvement of the crime was normal, 
and supported the credibility of his later confession. Id. at 
500. 
After discussing the impropriety of admitting this 
testimony under evidentiary rules relating to impeachment of 
witnesses and foundation for expert testimony, this Court 
explained that the prosecution should not ask jurors to base 
their conclusions in a specific case on evidence of probabilities 
based on what happened in other cases, but should encourage 
jurors to focus on the evidence pertinent to the specific case 
before them. This Court stated: 
Finally, even if the testimony was 
proper impeachment evidence, it should have 
been excluded because its potential for 
prejudice substantially outweighed its 
probative value. In this case, the 
prosecution attempted to establish, in 
effect, that there was a high statistical 
probability that Dyson lied. Even where 
statistically valid probability evidence has 
been presented - and Welti's testimony hardly 
qualifies as such - courts have routinely 
excluded it when the evidence invites the 
jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, 
numerical conclusion rather than to analyze 
the evidence before it and decide where truth 
lies. Probabilities cannot conclusively 
establish that a single event did or did not 
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In the instant case, the prosecutor improperly asked 
Appellant's jurors to reason that Appellant was guilty because 
the exclusion of the another person with a possible motive to 
start the fire made Appellant's guilt more probable . The trial 
court acted properly in excluding this evidence, and in 
introducing it, the prosecutor called to the attention of the 
21 jurors a matter which was not properly considered. 
2. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE JURORS WERE PROBABLY 
INFLUENCED BY THOSE REMARKS. 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984), the 
appellant was convicted of aggravated arson and insurance fraud 
in a jury trial during which the prosecutor's conduct was 
improper. Id., at 485. The prosecutor informed the jurors that 
the appellant had gone by a different name in the past, that the 
appellant was a witness under the protection of the federal 
government, that the appellant had been represented in other 
criminal proceedings. Jd. at 485. The prosecutor also compared 
the appellant's behavior to that of John Hinckley, and asked the 
jurors to consider their personal experiences in reaching their 
occur and are particularly inappropriate when 
used to establish facts "not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis," such as whether a 
particular individual is telling the truth at 
any given time. 
Id. at 501 (citations omitted). 
21 See also State v. Sinclair, 389 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah 
1964)(Court did not err in precluding question concerning whether 
accomplice was also charged with the crime because "[o]rdinarily 
whether someone else has been charged with the instant offense is 
indeed immaterial to the issue to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant who is on trial. The issue of concern, here was not 
[the accomplice's] guilt or innocence but the defendant's."). 
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verdict* I_d. at 485, 486* 
After concluding that the prosecutor had called to the 
attention of the jurors matters which were not properly to be 
considered, this Court concluded that the prosecutor's 
misconduct mandated a new trial. jCcl. at 487• The facts of the 
case provided in the opinion indicate that Troy involved a fire 
involving natural gas and accelerants ("probably gasoline") in a 
dwelling owned by the appellant and his ex-wife. The state 
alleged that the appellant's motive was his desire to obtain 
insurance proceeds because he was in financial straights. The 
appellant visited the burned home on the day of the fire, and a 
large can of gasoline was found in his car. Testimony indicated 
that the appellant was working during the fire. I^d. at 484. 
While the comments made by the prosecutor in Troy 
merely expressed the prosecutor's view that the appellant was a 
person who had engaged in some unsavory activities in general, 
the evidence introduced by the prosecutor in this case attempted 
to demonstrate an increased probability that appellant started 
the fire at issue in this case, by excluding another possible 
suspect. Thus, the evidence the prosecutor introduced in this 
case had a more harmful impact than that in Troy. 
The entirely circumstantial evidence against Appellant 
in the instant case is weaker than that presented in Troy. 
Review of the statement of facts indicates that the jurors could 
have concluded that the fire was caused by a cigarette, by 
accelerants in the apartment below Ms. Lee's, or by accelerants 
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in the air conditioner or those inherent in the carpeting, by 
the gas log, or by some combination of these things . Appellant 
was with his father at the time the fire began, and there was no 
gas or other accelerant seen or found in Appellant's possession. 
In these circumstances, it is appropriate for this Court to once 
again conclude that the misconduct of the prosecutor calls for 
reversal of Appellant's conviction because "there was not 
compelling proof of defendant's guilt. The jury could have found 
either way." Troy at 487. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-103 defines aggravated 
arson as follows; 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damagess 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any 
person not a participant in the offense is in 
the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the 
first degree. 
Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence 
that arson was committed, or that he committed it. The standard 
of review of such a claim of insufficiency of the evidence was 
explained in State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). The 
Court said: 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
and will interfere only when the evidence is 
so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not possibly have 
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reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt* 
Id. at 550. If the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable, this Court must reverse Appellant's 
conviction. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Particularly after comparing the instant case with 
other arson cases, this Court should conclude that there was no 
conclusive evidence that the fire was caused by arson, or by 
Appellant. 
Fire investigators found no accelerant containers or 
other modes of starting a fire in or near the apartment (T. 198). 
Ms. Lee's apartment was full of natural fire hazards - it had 
just been cleaned (T. 364) (cleaning agents contain hydrocarbons 
(T. 120-122)), the gas log was on and tipped over (T. 171-172, 
192), the carpeting was composed of hydrocarbons (T. 111-114, 
117), and people were smoking cigarettes in the apartment on the 
day of the fire (T. 366). Possible natural fire sources such as 
the air conditioner (T. 192-193, 196), clothing on the floor (T. 
199-200, 292), and apartment full of cleaning materials directly 
below the burned apartment were not investigated for hydrocarbon 
, 22 
content (T. 198-199). 
The State presented inconsistent testimony about 
22 Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; large drums of fire 
accelerants were moved into the burned structure, and 
intentionally poured); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendants had a large 
quantity of acetone, a fire accelerant, in their home, and 
acetone-soaked suitcases and a device for igniting the fire were 
found in the home after the fire). 
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whether or not there were pour patterns in the apartment (T* 201-
202; 283), and the investigator pointing out what he considered 
pour patterns testified that there was no conclusive proof that 
the patterns were caused by someone intentionally pouring 
flammable liquids (T. 284-285)e23 
Ms. Lee testified that she was the only one with a full 
set of keys to the apartment she left locked on the day of the 
fire (T. 355, 363-364). The windows to the apartment blew out 
from the heat of the fire (as opposed to falling inward during a 
break-in)(T. 100, 239), and the dead bolt and other lock to the 
only door to the apartment were found in a locked position after 
Mr. Van Os and Mr. Taylor pushed the door in during their rescue 
efforts (T. 204, 138-139, 219).24 
There was no physical evidence that Appellant started 
25 the fire in Ms. Lee8s apartment. Appellant and his father 
indicated that Appellant was at home with his father at the time 
26 
the fire started (T. 442-447). Appellant had no keys to Ms. 
23 Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; pour patterns were linked 
with trails of paper towels); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 
(Utah 1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; pour patterns and 
"trailers" between them were found in the burned home). 
24 Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; back door to burned structure 
was forced open). 
25 Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 892 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendant's prints found on 
accelerant container outside burned structure) . 
26 Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive; defendant was at work when 
the fire started); State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 
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Lee's apartment (T. 355, 363-364) and was not seen with any 
fire accelerants (T. 447). 2 8 
The conversation between Appellant and Karen Bateman on 
the night of the fire was unclear. Appellant either told Ms.. 
Bateman that Ms. Lee• s apartment was in flames or that he flamed 
Ms. Lee's apartment (T. 394-395, 426). While the clarification 
of that statement was crucial to the prosecution, the 
clarification was impossible because Ms. Bateman was drunk when 
Appellant came over at approximately 3s30 a.m. on the night of 
the fire (T. 395, 399), and because Ms. Bateman was interviewed 
by the fire investigator on the morning of the fire, while her 
friend, the victim, Ms. Lee, was present and repeatedly 
29 interrupting the interview (T. 427-428, 430). Particularly in 
light of the physical evidence in this case, which indicates that 
Appellant had no mode of access to Ms. Lee's apartment, and which 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; defendant's alibi, even if 
true, did not preclude the possibility that he started the fire). 
27 Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive - defendant maintained the 
burned home, and was inside it almost daily and on the day of the 
fire); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 1986)(defendants 
burned their own home, to which they had access). 
28 Compare State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 
1984)(evidence of arson inconclusive; defendant in possession of 
large can of gasoline, the probable fire accelerant used in the 
fire); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986)(defendant 
told her neighbor she had acetone, a fire accelerant, by the 
barrelful). 
29 Compare State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 
1986)(evidence of arson sufficient; modus operandi of starting 
fire fit description of what defendant told his co-worker he 
would do if he were fired). 
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does not prove that the fire was caused by arson, the Court 
should not allow Appellant's conviction to stand on one of Ms* 
Bateman8s two versions of what Appellant said on the night of the 
fire* 
Because the State failed to present proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the fire in Ms. Lee's apartment was caused 
by arson, or specifically by Appellant, Appellant's conviction 
should be reversed and this Court should declare him innocent as 
a matter of law* State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 403 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction and 
bar his retrial. In the event that this Court finds that there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this Court 
should reverse Appellant's conviction on either or both of the 
grounds articulated in Points I and II, and remand this case for 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this *^ day of Sepfonio^/O # 
1989. 
Appei: 
BROOKE C. WEL 
Attorney for 
/ 
Attorney fdr Appellant 
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APPENDIX 1 
1| accounted for, Bailiff? 
21 THE BAILIFF: Yes, sir. 
3 THE COURT: And the defendant is 
4 | present. Where is the jury list? 
5| At this point, the attorneys get to 
6| execise what we call preemptory challenges. 
7| (Preemptory challenges made.) 
8| (Jury admonished & noon recess.) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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(Noon Recess* ) 
THE COURTs The record may reflect that 
the panel has returned. I assume we are all present 
and accounted for? 
BAILIFF? Yese 
THE COORTs And the defendant is 
present • 
Where's the jury list? 
(Discussion off the record) 
(In chambers) 
THE COURTs Proceed* 
MS. WELLSs Your Honor, at this time, 
the defendant would move to quash the jury as it is 
presently composed* The reason for that is that as 
his fourth preemptory challenge, the State, Mr. Bown 
specifically, chose to strike the only minority member 
on the jury venier. I think there is -- I know there 
is -- I don't have it with me -- a Utah case decided 
probably within the last two years dealing 
specifically with a deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, 
Mr. Walsh, who likewise struck a minority member* I 
know now. It was State v. Cantu (phonetic). 
In that case, the Supreme Court remanded 
the matter back to the trial court for a hearing as to 
what explanation the prosecutor would be prepared to 
62 QUASH JURY 
l \ give and to determine whether it was sufficient to 
2 find that the exercise of the challenge of a minority 
3 member was based upon any type of rational or 
4 objective criteriae 
5 The obvious problem here is that the 
6 | research and testimony that have been given and taken 
7 and accepted by other courts, including appellate 
8 I courts, is that minority members are more likely than 
9 other members of the citizenry to vote for acquittal. 
10 And that the State cannot be allowed to exercise 
11 preemptory challenges to eliminate those persons from 
12 the fair cross section of the jury venier unless ther 
13 is some reason that can be pointed to. And my notes 
14 indicate that Mr. -- I think it's Phung, P-h-u-n-g, 
15 who was Prospective Juror No. 6, did not answer any 
16 questions in a manner that would indicate that he 
17 could not be a fair and objective juror. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Bown. 
l
* I MR. BOWNs Well, your Honor, the way I 
pick a jury, is I pick the ones that I would like on 
the jury. And I've gone through each of those, and i 
I have a question, I write a question mark. If I, fo 
various reasons, including that a person is young and 
single and I don't think has the experience to 
understand, as well as someone older, frankly. I hav 
63 QUASH JURY 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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gone through the ones that I have, and I had --
actually, I had five — a couple that I had marked off 
initially, and then only five people I had a question 
about, whether I wanted them on the jury or not. The 
rest were acceptable to me. 
One of those was Linda Miller, I had 
question about. That was then struck off by defense 
counsel on their Number 2. So that left me with -- I 
had no question about everybody except four people. 
It's my practice, simply, if I have any 
question — it's more of a gut reaction than 
anything. It has nothing to do with his — in fact, I 
didn't even know about a study that says they are more 
likely to be —• I think perhaps he has been around 
long enough, and perhaps I can speculate. He's been 
through enough, having come from Vietnam, that I think 
that the study would be different with Mr. Phung. 
But he was just one I had a question 
about initially, and so he ended up being the one that 
I -- I had to take someone off, and I took him. It 
was not directed at him as a minority. 
I think also in this case, it may be 
relevant that this defendant is not a minority. 
MS. WELLS: I think it's been determined 
that it matters not if the defendant is of a minority 
CA nnASH JURY 
l \ race, him or herself, but rather what the relative 
2 proneness may be of minority versus other members to 
3 vote for guilt or acquittal. 
4 Your Honor, I know that that case is 
5 probably about two years olde I think we could find 
6 J it very quickly, State v. Cantu, and I would ask the 
7 Court to look at that case before making a decision, 
8 I didnBt anticipate this, so I donft have any copy of 
9 it with me. 
10 THE COURT: Well, if you want to try to 
11 find it here briefly, you can. 
12 (Discussion off the record) 
13 THE COURT: The Court denies the motion 
14 to quash the panel, first, on the basis that the issu 
15 was not timely raised. It wasnft raised until after 
16 the rest of the panel was excused. And had it been 
17 J raised earlier, the Court could have examined the 
panel and examined the prosecutor to determine whethe 
or not there was a discriminatory purpose or motive 
involved. And, moreover, the Utah case discusses the 
case of Badson (phonetic), a United States Supreme 
Court case, indicating the burden is upon the 
I defendant to show that he's a member of a cognizable 
racial group. 
MS. WELLS: Excuse me, your Honor. I 
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18 
19 
20 
2 
h£nlc what the case says is that Badson is no longer 
applicable. I think it says that Badson used to be 
the rule, but now we are saying that no, 
THE COURTs Ism not sure that I see that 
language* They go through and talk about each factor 
of the Badson Teste 
MS. WELLS; Well, the head notes, I 
8 I looked at them, indicate that the trial court is 
9 required to examine the record to determine if all the 
10 facts and circumstances of the voir dire and the 
11 subsequent striking raise any inference that the 
12 prosecution would have used the challenges in any type 
13 of discriminatory manner. 
14 I think what that says is that the court 
15 is required to look and see if there are any objective 
16 reasons why this person should have been stricken as 
17 opposed to another person with equally innocuous types 
18 of answers. It says, "That a single challenge to a 
19 jury, based upon race, is impermissable under the 14th 
20 Amendment." And I see nothing in the head notes 
21 specifically that deals with whether or not the 
22 defendant, as Utah Courts interpret it, must be of a 
23 minor ity race. 
24 in fact, it is my clear recollection 
25 that even if this case does not specifically say it, 
^ * riTTACW .TTTPY 
that there are numerous cases which indicate that the 
defendant need not be a minority member himself in 
1 order to assert this on his behalf* 
. If I may respond to the timely raised, 
5 that all happened very quickly* The striking by Mr* 
6 Bown of this particular prospective juror was his 
7 fourth preemptory challenge* I felt that it would be 
8 improper to call the Court's attention, or anyone else 
9 in the courtroom, attention to this fact until the 
10 entire jury selection had been completed* And I chose 
11 to do that before any jurors were sworn* But I 
12 suggest that it would have been awkward and suggestive 
13 after having exercised those challenges for the Court 
14 then to undertake to have this type of hearing or to 
15 further expand the jury selection at that time. 
16 So with appropriate respect, I don't 
17 believe that I raised that in an untimely fashion, and 
18 would indicate that it was only a matter of maybe one 
19 to two minutes after the exercise of the challenge was 
20 made until I called the Court's attention to it. 
21 THE COURT: The Court simply observes 
22 that as the preemptories are being exercised, they are 
23 stricken one by the prosecutor and then one by the 
24 defendant. Then that list of prospective jurors goes 
25 back and forth. And when the fourth one is struck by 
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the prosecutor, it comes back to defense counsel with 
still one more to take. And so you've got that time 
while you are selecting your fourth one to observe 
that that's been done. And the bailiff passes it back 
and forth each time so that you can check each one. I 
have had that issue raised before, and have had 
counsel ask to approach the bench and ask the Court to 
inquire as to the reasons for it. 
The Badson case did talk about the 
burdens being upon defendant, and to show some basis 
for discrimination. Does the defendant in this case 
claim that he is part of a cognizable racial group? 
THE DEFENDANT? I don't know what that 
is o 
MS. WELLS: He is a member of the white 
race, your Honor. However, it is our position that he 
need not himself be a member of a minority race in 
order to have standing to challenge the striking of a 
minority member for the reasons that I've already 
stated. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
If it is raised at the time before the 
rest of the panel is excused, it gives the Court an 
°PPortunity to pursue that issue, do it in chambers 
and outside the hearing of the panel, and go through 
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. b e f o r e t h e - - you have t o s t a r t over s e l e c t i n g a 
new j u r y . 
So principally on the basis of 
timeliness, as well as I think the burdens seem to be 
indicated to be upon the defendant to show that he is 
of a recognizable minority group, the Court concludes 
that the motion ought to be denied. 
(In open court.) 
THE COURT: Would you stand and raise 
your right hand? 
(Jury sworn & Preliminary Instructions Read) 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would at this 
time invoke the Exclusionary Rule as to all the 
potential witnesses, and ask the Court to admonish 
them as to the meaning of that rule. 
MR. BOWN: I have four witnesses here, 
who are witnesses. 
THE COURT: Would you all come forward 
and be sworn? 
(Prospective Witnesses Sworn.) 
THE COURT: You are all to go out in the 
hall, and remain until you are called. You are not to 
talk to each other about the case. You are not to 
permit anybody else to talk to you about the case. If 
someone approaches you and tries to talk about the 
APPENDIX 2 
excused? 
DI-REC? - -BX-ft-Mi-NA-TIO-N 
MS. WELLS: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT? May this witness be 
MR. BOWN: I would so move. 
THE COORT: You may be excused. Thank 
yOU • 
You may call your next witness. 
Gft-ftKFP-frOB-S-ew, called as a 
witness on behalf of the State, after having been duly 
10 | sworn, testified as follows: 
i: 
12| BY MRC BOWNs 
Q. Would you state your name, please? 
A. Grant Hodson. 
Q. Spell your last name. 
A. H-o-d-s-o-n. 
Q. And do you have any relationship with 
the address of 2800 South Adams in South Salt Lake? 
A. Yes, I'm the landlord. 
Q. You own the building? 
A. I'm buying it from Construction Realty 
from Don Christiansen, who, in turn, has a mortgage 
*ith Deseret Federal. 
Q. How long have you been buying that? 
A. Three years. 
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Qe What kind of a building is it? 
A. It's a little over ten years old, 
twenty-four units. It fs attractive* 
Q» In November of 1988 -- what was your 
occupancy just prior to the fire? 
A. It wasn't very good before or after the 
fire. It was worse after the fire. But it was about 
55, 60 percent occupancy prior to the fire, and about 
40 percent after. 
10I MS. WELLS? Objection to after. It fs 
11 not relevant ® 
12 THE COURT? Sustained, 
13 MR. BOWNs Well — okay. 
14 As a result of the -- are you aware of a 
15 fire at that building on or about the 16th of 
16 November? 
17 I A . Yes, I am. 
18I Q . What kind of repairs were done -- what 
19 condition is that building in today? 
20
 MS. WELLS: Objection, relevancy. 
21 I THE COURT: What fs the relevance of it? 
MR. BOWN: Your Honor, I'm -- what I'm 
attempting to do is show that one person who might be 
a suspect in the fire, this gentleman, had no reason 
to do that. 
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MS* WELLSs We are not --
MR. BOWNs Had no reason to fire -- to 
«tart a fire in his own apartment? although, he could 
be a suspect. 
MS. WELLSs Well, Ifm certainly not 
claiming that, or wouldnft intend on asking such 
questions* The relevancy as to the condition now, 
though, still is objectionable. 
THE COORTs Sustained. 
MR. BOWNs Did you sustain any losses as 
a result of the fire? 
MS. WELLSs I will object to that, as 
well. 
THE COURTi Sustained. 
MR. BOWNs May we approach the bench, 
your Honor? 
THE CODRTs You may. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. BOWNs Mr. Hodson, when did you 
first learn about the fire at your building? 
A. At 5s00 a.m. on -- I think it was the 
morning of the 16th. It was the day of the fire, 15th 
or 16th of November. The manager gave me a call on 
the phone that morning. 
Q. Have you suffered as a result of that 
I 413 HODSON WIT ST D 
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A. E x c u s e me, w h a t ? 
Q . Yes o r n o , h a v e you s u f f e r e d a s a r e s u l t 
ot t h a t f i r e ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q. Did you start that fire? 
A. No. 
MS. WELLS: Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. It may be 
stricken. You are to disregard it. 
MS. WELLS: And your Honor --
MR. BOWN: I have no further questions. 
MS. WELLS: -- I think I need to make a 
motion outside the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: You may. 
We will be recess for five minutes. 
The jury is admonished not to talk to 
each other, not to talk to anyone, not to form or 
express any opinions. 
We will meet counsel in chambers. 
(Recess) 
(In chambers) 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, defense would 
move for a mistrial. Immediately before the last 
question asked by the prosecutor, we approached the 
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^h at the defense's request --
MR. BOWN: At my request* 
MS. WELLSs I am sorry* I think it was 
gine* 
MR. BOWN: It was mine* 
MS. WELLS: But either way — 
THE COURT: At the prosecutor's request. 
MS. WELLS: Either way, a conference at 
side bar off the record was that I was objecting to 
t| j the relevancy of asking any questions of Mr. Hodson, 
ji the landlord, that would eliminate him as a suspect in 
12 the case. And I also objected to any questions 
J) concerning whether or not he would have suffered any 
14 particular loss in this fire beyond the obvious, that 
15 he would have as a landlord. 
U I believe that the Court agreed with me, 
n\ that it would be improper for the prosecution to go 
** any further beyond the general question of, "Did you 
l» suffer a loss?" 
20
 Counsel's next immediate question was, 
21
 "Did you start the fire?", to which the witness 
22
 responded, "No." That question and the elicited 
response were clearly contrary to the Court's ruling 
*t the bench, and serve to prejudice this defendant as 
the prosecution attempted to eliminate other possible 
415 MISTRIAL 
suspects• 
I further indicated at the bench I had 
no intention of indicating the landlord in any way was 
responsible* and wasnft intending to argue that* And 
I believe the prosecutor went directly against the 
Court's order and asked an ultimate and improper 
7 I ques t ion • 
3 MR, BOWNi Each and every time there's a 
9 theft or a crime where more than one person could have 
10 committed it, I submit it is relevant* And it's asked 
11 routinely about -- with people, "Did you commit it?" 
12 And I think that's -- that is relevant* I can't see 
13 any -- the Court sustaining the objection* I can't 
14 see that there's any prejudice to the defendant. 
15 If they are arguing that -- I assume, 
16 reasonable doubt, the only way reasonable doubt can 
17 enter into it is if someone -- that if* in fact, the 
18 jury finds that it was an arson, that someone had to 
19 set that. It has to be a person. And for the 
20 defendant to say, "Well, there's a reasonable doubt 
21 the only way that there can be a reasonable doubt is 
22
 if there's a possibility, a likelihood, a reasonable 
23
 doubt based upon the fact that someone else set that 
2
* fire. 
25 And very frankly, as I analyze the 
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f a c t s , t h e p e r s o n s who a r e - - t o whom blame can be 
a t t a c h e d a r e t h e l a n d l o r d , w i t h p o t e n t i a l i n s u r a n c e 
fraud in a f i r e , s e t f i r e of an a p a r t m e n t ; Barbara 
1 
I 
3 
4 Lee, it's her apartment and the defendant? or someone 
c clear out of the blue* I'm attempting to eliminate 
( the doubt that would enter into if that evidence is 
7 not involved in the case. 
g MS. WELLS: Your Honor, that's not the 
9 I issue. The Court made a ruling at the bench, and 
10 counsel disregarded the Court's ruling, and asked the 
11 question, anyway. 
12 THE COURT: The Court will deny the 
13 motion for mistrial. 
14 It's relevant, but my conclusion was 
15 that he wasn't charged, he wasn't a suspect and there 
16 wasn't anything in the record to suggest it. And I 
17 thought it unnecessary, and so indicated that I didn't 
18 think it was appropriate under the circumstances. 
19 I granted the -- sustained the 
20 objection, admonished the jury -- indicated it was 
21 stricken, and admonished them to ignore it. And based 
22
 upon that, I'll deny the motion for a mistrial. 
23
 MS. WELLS: I would ask counsel to 
24
 indicate if he intends to ask -- he did not ask that 
25
 question of Barbara Lee. 
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jl MR, BOWNs That's true, I didnst think 
2 about that issue until this morning as I was doing my 
3 closing. 
4 MS. WELLSs Is there any attempt to 
5 elicit that information from anybody else? 
6 MR. BOWNj I think as far as with 
7 Barbara Lee, the evidence is clear that she was 
8 elsewhere with someone else, someone who said she was 
9 elsewhere. 
10 MS. WELLSs Well, I would ask a -- that 
11 the Court order that no further --
12 MR. BOWN: I have no further questions 
13 of him, and that's essentially the end of my case. As 
14 soon as there's cross-examination, it will be over. 
15 MS. WELLSs Because we have a record and 
16 side-bar conferences are not placed on the record, 
17 would the Court clarify that you did, in fact, make a 
18 ruling that that solicitation of testimony was 
19 irrelevant and that the objection was sustained? 
20 THE COURT: Under the circumstances, it 
21 was appropriate since the landlord hadn't been 
22 charged, and there may be any number of people that 
23 might be suspects. And under the circumstances, I 
24 didn't think it was material to the case, and so 
25 indicated that would be my ruling. 
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« MR. BOWNs I apologize, your Honor, It 
2 was -- in my mind, that question was not precluded. 
3 It was -- you know, I can't tell you the process that 
I I went through* But as I asked the question, I 
5 thought it was -- it was not precluded by the side 
6 bar. 
7 THE COURT: There was an earlier 
8 I reservation of an exception. If that's convenient, we 
9 will make that on the record. 
10 MS. WELLS; It was my renewed motion in 
11 limine, where Ms. Bateman was not able to indicate 
12 when or where -- when, particularly, the conversation 
13 took place about alleged bombing of a car, and that 
14 that would have been outside the Court's earlier 
15 ruling with regard to what the prosecutor could go 
16 into • 
17 THE COURT: The Court overruled the 
18 objection. The information the Court had earlier was 
19 that there was a statement against interest about 
20 flaming her house, or apartment, and her statements 
21 were inconsistent, apparently, with the statements 
22 which she made to the fire investigator. And because 
23 the prosecutor was -- it was apparent he was caught by 
24 surprise, I allowed him to pursue those subjects. 
25
 MR. BOWN: And I still do have a witness 
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ADDENDUM 
United States Constitution, Amendment 6 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel 
for his defence. 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14 section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Utah Constitution Article I section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution Article I section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right ... to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed. 
Utah Constitution Article I section 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-103 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle 
when any person not a participant 
in the offense is in the structure 
or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the 
first degree. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-2 
It is the policy of this state that 
persons selected for jury service be selected 
at random from a fair cross section of the 
population of the area served by the court, 
and that all qualified citizens have the 
opportunity in accordance with this act to be 
considered for jury service and have the 
obligation to serve as jurors when summoned 
for that purpose. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-3 
A citizen shall not be excluded or 
exempt from jury service on account of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, or 
economic status. 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-46-16 
(1) Within seven days after the moving 
party discovered, or by the exercise of 
diligence could have discovered the grounds 
therefore, and in any event before the trial 
jury is sworn to try the case, a party may 
move to stay the proceedings or to quash an 
indictment, or for other appropriate relief, 
on the ground of substantial failure to 
comply with this act in selecting a grand or 
trial jury. 
(2) Upon motion filed under this section 
containing a sworn statement of acts which if 
true would constitute a substantial failure 
to comply with this act, the moving party may 
present testimony of the county clerk, the 
clerk of the court, any relevant records and 
papers not public or otherwise available 
used by the jury commission or the clerk, and 
any other relevant evidence. If the court 
determines that in selecting either a grand 
or a trial jury there has been a substantial 
failure to comply with this act and it 
appears that actual and substantial injustice 
and prejudice has resulted or will result to 
a party in consequence of the failure, the 
court shall stay the proceedings pending the 
selection of the jury in conformity with this 
act, quash an indictment, or grant other 
appropriate relief. 
(3) The procedures prescribed by this 
section are the exclusive means by which a 
person accused of a crime, the state, or a 
party in a civil case may challenge a jury on 
the ground that the jury was not selected in 
conformity with this act. 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 
A lawyer shall not ... (c) Knowingly disobey 
an obligation under the rules of a tribunal 
except for an open refusal based on an 
assertion that no valid obligation exists;... 
(e) In trial, allude to any matter that the 
lawyer does not reasonably believe is 
relevant or that will not be supported by 
admissible evidence,...". 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.nd 
discretion of the trial court. 
